This article deals with the integration of ethical reflection into the research practices of the project at the Lille Nord-Pas-de-Calais genopole: “Multifactorial genetic pathologies and therapeutic innovations”. The general hypothesis of this text is that changes in research practices in biology (mainly through the use of bioinformatics) imply changes in medical practices, which require critical reflection. This hypothesis could be broken down into three sub-hypotheses: (1) Research in biology is undergoing a complete transformation; (2) Research in biology is a cultural (...) practice, which cannot be reduced to a simple cognitive action; (3) Research in biology is a techno-scientific practice. As for the method, the aim of our research at the Medical Ethics Centre is to elucidate the philosophical and ethical range of biomedical practices. This work entails a double task for reflection. On the one hand, from the revelation of ethical tensions present in these practices, we have to think about what is at stake in these practices, and more broadly in society. On the other hand, we have to analyse the conditions enabling the actors to assume the significance of ethical reflection in their practices. The method set up to undertake this double task could be qualified as “narrative hermeneutics”, as its aim is to attempt to interpret the stakes in practices from proximity with these practices and from what their actors have to say about them. The text then goes on to analyse more specifically the emergence and place of bioinformatics in present-day biomedical research. (shrink)

La crise structurelle de la psychiatrie questionne aujourd’hui le modèle médical dans son ensemble. Premier poste de dépense de l’assurance maladie, les techniques de soins psychiatriques, soins de la subjectivité malade, sont-elles destinées à être numérisées? L’influence étasunienne, vecteur d’un retour de la neuropsychiatrie, tend à le laisser croire. À partir des constats observés au fil de l’histoire de la psychiatrie française, nous interrogerons cette tendance, ses fantasmes et réalités, pour préciser les conditions d’une appropriation des technologies qui améliore le (...) service médico-psychiatrique individuel et collectif. (shrink)

Marie-Magdeleine Davy (1903-1998) était philosophe, écrivaine et maître de recherche au cnrs. Profondément engagée dans la vie intellectuelle de son époque, elle confia ses plus riches pensées à d'innombrables écrits publiés pendant plus d'un demi-siècle. On y croise les figures essentielles de sa méditation : Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Nicolas Berdiaev, Louis Massignon, Gabriel Marcel, Roger Godel, Henry Corbin, Simone Weil, Henri Le Saux et tant d'autres. Esprit indépendant et non conventionnel, éternelle voyageuse en quête d'absolu, Marie-Magdeleine Davy ne cessa d'affirmer (...) que la connaissance de soi se présente comme une recherche du sens de la Vie, c'est-à-dire une recherche de la Vérité conduisant à une démarche d'intériorité.00± Découvrir sa dimension de profondeur permet de prendre contact avec l'Infini qui est en soi ; ce caractère d'éternité humanise et rend possible la véritable communication avec autrui.? Telle est la conviction de Marie-Magdeleine Davy, après avoir lu, médité et conversé avec des hommes et des femmes en Orient et en Occident.00Pour beaucoup d'Européens, Marie-Magdeleine Davy aura été un témoin de la dimension d'intériorité que tout être porte en lui, une preuve vivante de cet aspect autre de la vie capable de donner un sens au monde et à l'Histoire. ± Une grande dame.? C'est ainsi que les Deux-Sévriens qui l'ont connue l'appellent encore. Ses archives, désormais classées, apportent un éclairage nouveau sur une œuvre et une pensée s'adressant à tous ceux qui sont soucieux de répondre à leur destin. (shrink)

Οι ανασκαφές του βόρειου τείχους της Αμαθούντος οδήγησαν στην ανακάλυψη ενός ζωικού συνόλου, που προσφέρει μια νέα άποψη της πανίδας της πόλης, εξαιτίας των αρχαιολογικών συμφραζομένων και της χρονολόγησης αυτού του δευτερογενούς αποθέτη, ο οποίος χρησιμοποιήθηκε στη στήριξη μιας επισκευής του οχυρωματικού περιβόλου. Έτσι, το δείγμα που περισυνελέγει δίνει μια πρωτότυπη εικόνα της διατροφής με κρέας στην αρχαϊκή εποχή και της μεταχείρισης ορισμένων πτωμάτων, τα οποία εγκαταλείφθηκαν σε αποθέτες χωρίς να έχουν καταναλωθεί. Αυτή η πρώτη προσέγγιση της οικονομίας παραγωγής τροφίμων (...) σε έναν αστικό χώρο, αποδεικνύει ότι η διατροφή βασιζόταν στα κλασικά οικόσιτα θηλαστικά και επιβεβαιώνει τις παρατηρήσεις, που είχαν γίνει για τις προηγούμενες περιόδους, σχετικά με τη διαφορετική μεταχείριση των ιπποειδών και των σκύλων. Το περιορισμένο φάσμα της πανίδας υπογραμμίζει με βεβαιότητα τον ανθρώπινης προέλευσης χαρακτήρα των απορριμμάτων αυτών, με τα οποία δεν αναμιγνύεται κανένα άλλο ζώο, με εξαίρεση το λαγό, η κατανάλωση του οποίου μαρτυρείται ήδη από την εποχή του Χαλκού. (shrink)

Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently (...) plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine. (shrink)

Ancien fleuron de l’industrie horlogère, Lip est une manufacture bisontine connue pour les conflits sociaux retentissants dont elle fut le théâtre en 1973-1974 puis en 1976-1977, et se dota très vite d’une aura légendaire à laquelle participèrent de nombreuses productions culturelles et artistiques contemporaines des événements. Le temps passant, l’intervention fit place à la rétrospection : de nouvelles œuvres s’employèrent à revisiter cette histoire, tendues entre le mythe et ses angles morts, la commémoration et le souvenir. Publiée en 1998, Les (...) Yeux rouges de Dominique Féret est l’une des premières à s’inscrire dans cet après-coup. Composée de quatre entretiens avec d’anciens protagonistes des luttes de Lip, cette pièce en dit au moins tout autant sur le passé que sur le présent qui se tourne vers lui et traduit l’inflexion que connaît tout un pan du théâtre européen des années 2000, marqué par la résurgence de la question sociale mais aussi par des modulations pathétiques qui tendent à sa dépolitisation. (shrink)

In this article, we expand the analytical and theoretical foundations of the study of knowledge commons in the context of more classical agrarian commons, such as seed commons. We show that it is possible to overcome a number of criticisms of earlier work by Ostrom on natural commons and its excludability/rivalry matrix in addressing the inclusive social practices of “commoning”, defined as a way of living and acting for the preservation of the commons. Our empirical analysis emphasizes, using the most (...) recent advances in the IAD/ses framework, the distributed and collaborative knowledge governance in a French peasant seed network as a key driver for reintroducing cultivated agrobiodiversity and on-farm seed conservation of ancient and landrace varieties. These inclusive peasant seed groups developed alternative peer-to-peer models of collaborative peasant-led community-based breeding and grassroots innovations in the search for more resilient population varieties. Our results highlight the various models of collective action within the network and discuss the organizational tradeoffs of opting out of peasant seed activities and recreating a shared collective knowledge base on the benefits of restoring cultivated agrobiodiversity. It helps us better understand how modern peasant seed groups function as epistemic communities which contributes to envisioning alternative agricultural systems. (shrink)

'Ontological dependence' is a term of philosophical jargon which stands for a rich family of properties and relations, often taken to be among the most fundamental ontological properties and relations. Notions of ontological dependence are usually thought of as 'carving reality at its ontological joints', and as marking certain forms of ontological 'non-self-sufficiency'. The use of notions of dependence goes back as far as Aristotle's characterization of substances, and these notions are still widely used to characterize other concepts and to (...) formulate metaphysical claims. This paper first gives an overview of the varieties of these notions, and then discusses some of their main applications. (shrink)

It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that (...) philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories. (shrink)

How does metaphysical grounding interact with the truth-functions? I argue that the answer varies according to whether one has a worldly conception or a conceptual conception of grounding. I then put forward a logic of worldly grounding and give it an adequate semantic characterisation.

Le concept d’Allemagne permet de révéler, selon une approche« misologique », l’ampleur des désaccords ayant présidé à la définition du concept d’État en France. De ce dernier, l’on aborde divers emplois qu’illustrent des modèles d’État. Le « modèle germanique » opère ainsi dans un débat qui est le creuset de la connaissance politique moderne, avec ses apories: celles de la souveraineté externe, de l’ordre interétatique, de la confédération. L’article expose alors la relation entre les théories du droit public et la (...) « continuité des assemblées »; d’une certaine manière, le fondement de l’ordre politique. Au final, le droit public apparaît comme le transfert du pouvoir temporel à l’instituant, au collectif, et son affaiblissement, comme la raison d’être de l’étatisme. (shrink)

The purpose of the book is to clarify the notion of existential dependence and cognate notions, such as supervenience and the notion of an internal relation. I defend the view that such notions are best understood in terms of the concept of metaphysical grounding, i.e. the concept of one fact obtaining in virtue of other facts, where ‘in virtue of’ has a distinctively metaphysical meaning.

Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, is the (...) first to address and investigate the metaphysical idea that certain facts are grounded in other facts. An introduction introduces and surveys the debate, examining its history as well as its central systematic aspects. The volume will be of wide interest to students and scholars of metaphysics. (shrink)

La doctrine picturale du classicisme instituait le parallèle de l’image et du verbe, elle adoptait pour maxime la formule extraite d’Horace « Ut pictura poesis » (« Il en est d’une poésie comme d’une peinture »). Gotthold Ephraïm Lessing réfute cette conception dans son Laocoon en opposant les propriétés du lisible à celles du visible, et en affirmant l’impossibilité d’établir une équivalence entre elles. Il met en crise la lisibilité de l’œuvre plastique en opérant une distinction fondamentale entre l’image et (...) le mot, avec pour conséquence de séparer nettement la finalité essentielle de la peinture et celle de la poésie. Lessing défend l’idée que les moyens de la peinture correspondent aux limites de la poésie, et que les moyens de la poésie correspondent aux limites de la peinture. Ce chiasme se résout dans le théâtre qui, unissant les pouvoirs du verbe et de l’image, surmonte les limites expressives de la poésie et de la peinture en conjuguant leurs pouvoirs respectifs. (shrink)

À l’instar d’Humpty Dumpty, le personnage de Lewis Carroll qui fête son non-anniversaire 364 jours par an, Bergson semble inscrire la discontinuité de l’événement dans la continuité de la durée. Il invite son lecteur à concevoir la nouveauté comme la trame du réel. Rien ne se répète jamais à l’identique, chaque événement est singulier et s’inscrit dans un temps irréversible. Pourtant, l’intelligence ne perçoit pas toujours cette « création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté » car elle immobilise et spatialise le réel en (...) le rendant homogène. Mais dès lors que l’esprit retrouve le caractère temporel de la réalité, le présent apparaît comme toujours inédit. Vu sous cet angle, la définition bergsonienne de l’événement semble donner au banal les caractéristiques de l’exceptionnel. Les non-anniversaires possèderaient la même consistance ontologique que les anniversaires sans pour autant disparaître dans l’homogénéité de la répétition quotidienne. L’événement serait à la fois une aspérité surgissant dans le flux de la durée et en même temps l’expression de la plus pure continuité. Pour résoudre cette apparente contradiction il faut alors se demander : comment Bergson réussit-il à concilier la nouveauté de l’événement avec la continuité de la durée? Pour répondre à cette question, nous montrerons comment Bergson introduit des différences qualitatives au sein de la continuité du devenir. Ces différences s’expriment à travers plusieurs niveaux de réalité que l’article étudie successivement. Nous partons de la métaphysique bergsonienne de la durée, capable de donner à l’événement un contenu réel et pas seulement représentatif. Grâce à l’épaisseur du devenir, l’événement se relie à la continuité spirituelle de la durée tout en conservant son caractère inédit et imprévisible. Son hétérogénéité le distingue de la pure discontinuité du fiat lux et de l’homogénéité mécaniste. La causalité des événements se révèle différente du simple mécanisme. Dans la seconde partie de l’article nous tirons les conséquences de cette métaphysique pour les appliquer à l’événement étudié sous l’angle de l’histoire. Partant d’un réexamen des apories du possible, nous examinons la valeur de l’uchronie pour ensuite décrire la manière dont Bergson théorise la connaissance historique et l’action des grands hommes. (shrink)

À l’instar d’Humpty Dumpty, le personnage de Lewis Carroll qui fête son non-anniversaire 364 jours par an, Bergson semble inscrire la discontinuité de l’événement dans la continuité de la durée. Il invite son lecteur à concevoir la nouveauté comme la trame du réel. Rien ne se répète jamais à l’identique, chaque événement est singulier et s’inscrit dans un temps irréversible. Pourtant, l’intelligence ne perçoit pas toujours cette « création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté » car elle immobilise et spatialise le réel en (...) le rendant homogène. Mais dès lors que l’esprit retrouve le caractère temporel de la réalité, le présent apparaît comme toujours inédit. Vu sous cet angle, la définition bergsonienne de l’événement semble donner au banal les caractéristiques de l’exceptionnel. Les non-anniversaires possèderaient la même consistance ontologique que les anniversaires sans pour autant disparaître dans l’homogénéité de la répétition quotidienne. L’événement serait à la fois une aspérité surgissant dans le flux de la durée et en même temps l’expression de la plus pure continuité. Pour résoudre cette apparente contradiction il faut alors se demander : comment Bergson réussit-il à concilier la nouveauté de l’événement avec la continuité de la durée? Pour répondre à cette question, nous montrerons comment Bergson introduit des différences qualitatives au sein de la continuité du devenir. Ces différences s’expriment à travers plusieurs niveaux de réalité que l’article étudie successivement. Nous partons de la métaphysique bergsonienne de la durée, capable de donner à l’événement un contenu réel et pas seulement représentatif. Grâce à l’épaisseur du devenir, l’événement se relie à la continuité spirituelle de la durée tout en conservant son caractère inédit et imprévisible. Son hétérogénéité le distingue de la pure discontinuité du fiat lux et de l’homogénéité mécaniste. La causalité des événements se révèle différente du simple mécanisme. Dans la seconde partie de l’article nous tirons les conséquences de cette métaphysique pour les appliquer à l’événement étudié sous l’angle de l’histoire. Partant d’un réexamen des apories du possible, nous examinons la valeur de l’uchronie pour ensuite décrire la manière dont Bergson théorise la connaissance historique et l’action des grands hommes. (shrink)

À l’instar d’Humpty Dumpty, le personnage de Lewis Carroll qui fête son non-anniversaire 364 jours par an, Bergson semble inscrire la discontinuité de l’événement dans la continuité de la durée. Il invite son lecteur à concevoir la nouveauté comme la trame du réel. Rien ne se répète jamais à l’identique, chaque événement est singulier et s’inscrit dans un temps irréversible. Pourtant, l’intelligence ne perçoit pas toujours cette « création continue d’imprévisible nouveauté » car elle immobilise et spatialise le réel en (...) le rendant homogène. Mais dès lors que l’esprit retrouve le caractère temporel de la réalité, le présent apparaît comme toujours inédit. Vu sous cet angle, la définition bergsonienne de l’événement semble donner au banal les caractéristiques de l’exceptionnel. Les non-anniversaires possèderaient la même consistance ontologique que les anniversaires sans pour autant disparaître dans l’homogénéité de la répétition quotidienne. L’événement serait à la fois une aspérité surgissant dans le flux de la durée et en même temps l’expression de la plus pure continuité. Pour résoudre cette apparente contradiction il faut alors se demander : comment Bergson réussit-il à concilier la nouveauté de l’événement avec la continuité de la durée? Pour répondre à cette question, nous montrerons comment Bergson introduit des différences qualitatives au sein de la continuité du devenir. Ces différences s’expriment à travers plusieurs niveaux de réalité que l’article étudie successivement. Nous partons de la métaphysique bergsonienne de la durée, capable de donner à l’événement un contenu réel et pas seulement représentatif. Grâce à l’épaisseur du devenir, l’événement se relie à la continuité spirituelle de la durée tout en conservant son caractère inédit et imprévisible. Son hétérogénéité le distingue de la pure discontinuité du fiat lux et de l’homogénéité mécaniste. La causalité des événements se révèle différente du simple mécanisme. Dans la seconde partie de l’article nous tirons les conséquences de cette métaphysique pour les appliquer à l’événement étudié sous l’angle de l’histoire. Partant d’un réexamen des apories du possible, nous examinons la valeur de l’uchronie pour ensuite décrire la manière dont Bergson théorise la connaissance historique et l’action des grands hommes. (shrink)

I identify a notion of logical grounding, clarify it, and show how it can be used (i) to characterise various consequence relations, and (ii) to give a precise syntactic account of the notion of “groundedness” at work in the literature on the paradoxes of truth.

Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more (...) specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions”, that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper. (shrink)

This monograph is a detailed study, and systematic defence, of the Growing Block Theory of time (GBT), first conceived by C.D. Broad. The book offers a coherent, logically perspicuous and ideologically lean formulation of GBT, defends it against the most notorious objections to be found in the extant philosophical literature, and shows how it can be derived from a more general theory, consistent with relativistic spacetime, on the pre-relativistic assumption of an absolute and total temporal order. -/- The authors devise (...) axiomatizations of GBT and its competitors which, against the backdrop of a shared quantified tense logic, significantly improves the prospects of their comparative assessment. Importantly, neither of these axiomatizations involves commitment to properties of presentness, pastness or futurity. The authors proceed to address, and defuse, a number of objections that have been marshaled against GBT, including the so-called epistemic objection according to which the theory invites skepticism about our temporal location. The challenge posed by relativistic physics is met head-on, by replacing claims about temporal variation by claims about variation across spacetime. -/- The book aims to achieve the greatest possible rigor. The background logic is set out in detail, as are the principles governing the notions of precedence and temporal location. The authors likewise devise a novel spacetime logic suited for the articulation, and comparative assessment, of relativistic theories of time. The book comes with three technical appendices which include soundness and completeness proofs for the systems corresponding to GBT and its competitors, in both their pre-relativistic and relativistic forms. -/- The book is primarily directed at researchers and graduate students working on the philosophy of time or temporal logic, but is of interest to metaphysicians and philosophical logicians more generally. (shrink)

When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I will call the notion of objectual essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some of (...) my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine’s compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulatinghis view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence—a view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some sympathy. (shrink)

In his influential paper ‘‘Essence and Modality’’, Kit Fine argues that no account of essence framed in terms of metaphysical necessity is possible, and that it is rather metaphysical necessity which is to be understood in terms of essence. On his account, the concept of essence is primitive, and for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all things. Fine also proposes a reduction of conceptual and logical necessity in (...) the same vein: a conceptual necessity is a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all concepts, and a logical necessity a proposition true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts. I argue that the plausibility of Fine's view crucially requires that certain apparent explanatory links between essentialist facts be admitted and accounted for, and I make a suggestion about how this can be done. I then argue against the reductions of conceptual and logical necessity proposed by Fine and suggest alternative reductions, which remain nevertheless Finean in spirit. (shrink)

The charged debate on the ‘C‐S‐R‐ization’ of organizational practices seems to have produced two opposing and seemingly incompatible explanations for why organizations should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR): one, the normative rationale based on an appeal to ethics; and the other, the instrumental rationale, based on an appeal to business pragmatism. This paper argues that a missing link in this debate is the failure to recognize that the normative and instrumental approaches to corporate social responsibility are underpinned by substantively, (...) differentiating, relative logics of emotional rationalism on the one hand, and instrumental rationalism on the other. The paper makes a case that for CSR as a management practice to be practicable and actionable within a sustainable business agenda, it will need to be stripped of its current normative undertone and reconstructed in the instrumentally, pragmatic (utlish) language of business. Otherwise, the whole concept of CSR may continue to dwell in the realm of abstract theorizing without yielding many beneficial and practicable outcomes. The paper concludes that such an approach that situates CSR within a pragmatic business lingua, rather than a non‐business lingua, will help in legitimizing CSR as a ‘neutral’ management practice. (shrink)

The charged debate on the ‘C‐S‐R‐ization’ of organizational practices seems to have produced two opposing and seemingly incompatible explanations for why organizations should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR): one, the normative rationale based on an appeal to ethics; and the other, the instrumental rationale, based on an appeal to business pragmatism. This paper argues that a missing link in this debate is the failure to recognize that the normative and instrumental approaches to corporate social responsibility are underpinned by substantively, (...) differentiating, relative logics of emotional rationalism on the one hand, and instrumental rationalism on the other. The paper makes a case that for CSR as a management practice to be practicable and actionable within a sustainable business agenda, it will need to be stripped of its current normative undertone and reconstructed in the instrumentally, pragmatic (utlish) language of business. Otherwise, the whole concept of CSR may continue to dwell in the realm of abstract theorizing without yielding many beneficial and practicable outcomes. The paper concludes that such an approach that situates CSR within a pragmatic business lingua, rather than a non‐business lingua, will help in legitimizing CSR as a ‘neutral’ management practice. (shrink)

I offer and defend an account of real definitions. I put forward two versions of the account, one formulated in terms of the notion of generalised identity and of a suitable notion of grounding, and the other one formulated in terms of the former notion and of a suitable notion of comparative joint-carvingness. Given a plausible assumption, and turn out to be equivalent. I give a sketch of a unified account of the three notions involved in and from which the (...) assumption can be derived. (shrink)

The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility (...) Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame and the Social Argument to shame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt have obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore in a systematic way the rationality of emotions elicited when we engage with works of fiction. I first lay out the approach to the emotions on which my discussion is premised. Next, I concentrate on two facets of emotional rationality—the first pertains to the relation between emotions and the mental states on which they are based, the second to the relation between emotions and the judgements and behaviour they elicit. These observations about (...) emotional rationality are then applied to emotions elicited by works of fiction. After having distinguished several families of emotions, I concentrate on what I call blob-emotions and emotions-for. I argue that, given their nature as direct responses to a restricted range of stimuli, blob-emotions are not irrational. As regards emotions-for fictional entities, I emphasize that a subject’s rationality shows in the way her emotions-for respond to evidence. On this basis, I discard an influential reason to think that emotions-for fictional entities are irrational. Finally, I offer an argument to conclude that they are typically correct and rational. (shrink)

I assume that truth-making is to be understood in terms of grounding, and I show how, on that assumption, various general properties of truth-making follow from certain features of grounding.

The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max turned up at the party and distinctively remembers where he was seated, so he easily gets his hands on his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The (...) fact that information is preserved distinguishes memory from imagination. But how do acquisition and retrieval of information contribute to the phenomenology of memory?The exclusive aim of this chapter is to sketch a map of the phenomenology of memory. It is structured as follows. In section 1, I introduce the contrast between content (what is remembered) and psychological attitude (remembering). This distinction will be helpful in disentangling issues in the phenomenology of memory. Section 2 is devoted to the contribution of memory content to phenomenology, section 3 to the contribution of the attitude of remembering. (shrink)

Social learning is likely to include affective processes: it is necessary for newcomers to discover what value to attach to objects, persons, and events in a given social environment. This learning relies largely on the evaluation of others’ emotional expressions. This study has two objectives. Firstly, we compare two closely related concepts that are employed to describe the use of another person’s appraisal to make sense of a given situation: social appraisal and social referencing. We contend that social referencing constitutes (...) a type of social appraisal. Secondly, we introduce the concept of affective social learning with the hope that it may help to discriminate the different ways in which emotions play a critical role in the processes of socialization. (shrink)

I introduce a proof system for the logic of relative fundamentality, as well as a natural semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete. I then “modalise” the logic, and finally I discuss the properties of grounding given a suggested account of this notion in terms of necessity and relative fundamentality.

In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...) of their contents. We then outline an alternative � the attitudinal theory of emotions. It parts with current theorizing about the emotions in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but in terms of the attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore what sorts of attitudes emotions are and claim that they are felt bodily attitudes. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that an important part of our knowledge is acquired via testimony. One of the main objectives of social epistemology is therefore to specify the conditions under which a hearer is justified in accepting a proposition stated by a source. Non-reductionists, who think that testimony could be considered as an a priori source of knowledge, as well as reductionists, who think that another type of justification has to be added to testimony, share a common conception about children development. Non-reductionists (...) believe that infants and children are fundamentally gullible and their gullibility could be seen as an example for justifying testimony, while reductionists believe that this gullibility is merely an exception that should be taken into account. The objective of this paper is to review contemporary literature in developmental psychology providing empirical grounds likely to clarify this philosophical debate. What emerges from current research is a more elaborated vision of children’s attitude toward testimony. Even at a very young age, children do not blindly swallow information coming from testimony; doubtful or contradictory information is automatically screened by their cognitive system. Even if they are unable to give positive reasons for the acceptance of a given testimony, young children are not gullible. Such empirical findings tend to call into question the radical opposition between reductionism and non-reductionism. (shrink)

We argue that presentism, understood as a view about time and existence, can perspicuously be defined in opposition to all other familiar contenders without appeal to any notion of presentness or cognate notions such as concreteness. Given recent worries about the suitability of such notions to cut much metaphysical ice, this should be welcomed by presentism's defenders. We also show that, irrespective of its sparse ideology, the proposed formulation forestalls any deviant interpretation at odds with the view it aims to (...) capture. (shrink)

Psychologists have emphasized children's acquisition of information through firsthand observation. However, many beliefs are acquired from others' testimony. In two experiments, most 4yearolds displayed sceptical trust in testimony. Having heard informants' accurate or inaccurate testimony, they anticipated that informants would continue to display such differential accuracy and they trusted the hitherto reliable informant. Yet they ignored the testimony of the reliable informant if it conflicted with what they themselves had seen. By contrast, threeyearolds were less selective in trusting a reliable (...) informant. Thus, young children check testimony against their own experience and increasingly recognise that some informants are more trustworthy than others. (shrink)

Realism about tense is the view that the contrast between what was, what is and what will be the case is real, and not merely a projection of our ways of thinking. Does this view entail realism about temporal passage, namely the view that time really passes, in the same sense of ‘real’? We argue that the answer is affirmative for many versions of tense realism, and indeed for all sensible versions. We thereby address an important conceptual issue regarding these (...) two forms of realism and rebut recent claims that tense realism is compatible with anti-realism about temporal passage. (shrink)

A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory, these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this paper, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. (...) The Past Reason Theory offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argument in favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation. (shrink)

In a recent article forthcoming in *Mind*, Leech (2020) presents a challenge for essentialist accounts of metaphysical modality: why should it be that essences imply corresponding necessities? Leech’s main focus is to argue that one cannot overcome the challenge by utilizing an account of essence in terms of generalized identity due to Correia and Skiles (2019), on pain of circularity. In this reply, we will show how to use identity-based essentialism to bridge ‘epistemic’ and ‘explanatory’ understandings of this alleged essence-to-necessity (...) gap without circularity, Leech’s arguments notwithstanding. We do so by first presenting a novel proof that generalized identities imply corresponding necessities. We then propose several substantive identity-based explanations of how it is, exactly, that essences imply necessities. -/- . (shrink)

We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...) most of the objections raised against it, including the objection that bodily feelings cannot account for the outward-looking and evaluative nature of emotions. In both sections, we argue that the kinds of felt bodily changes posited by a Jamesian account of emotions are best understood in terms of felt states of action-readiness. (shrink)